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Nunc Dimittis or Chief Cornerstone?: Evaluating
Africa’s International Norm-Development
Experiment in the Chad–Cameroon Pipeline
Project

Emeka Duruigbo*
Abstract: Africa extended and strengthened its status as a maker of international
law by spearheading the creation and implementation of the norm of “shared
sovereignty” in international criminal adjudication and the management of petroleum resources through the Special Court for Sierra Leone that was established to prosecute the principal actors in a devastating war in West Africa in
the 1990s and through the Chad–Cameroon Oil Pipeline Project that created a
model for effective production and utilization of natural resources for national
development. This article argues that by situating itself at the forefront of the
shared sovereignty experience, Africa is making significant contributions to the
development of international law and, despite an initial setback, Africa’s effort
represents a firm foundation upon which major progress can be established.
This article highlights the key challenges that orchestrated the failure of the
Chad project, focusing on the inability of international financial institutions
such as the World Bank Group and state actors to successfully manage complex
shared sovereignty arrangements, particularly in weak states in unstable regions. The paper further identifies the specific socio-political, economic, structural, and legal mechanisms that are imperative to ensuring the successful implementation of oil revenue management or natural-resource-based shared
sovereignty systems in developing nations grappling with sustainable economic
development and democratization.

*

Nunc Dimittis is the Latin rendering of the prayer by Simeon in the Gospel of Luke in which he prayed
that it was time for him to depart the earth since he had witnessed the long-awaited birth and dedication
of the Savior, Jesus Christ. Luke 2:29 (Authorized Version) (“Lord, now lettest thou thy servant depart
in peace, according to thy word . .”), available at http://www.biblegateway.com/passage/
?search=Luke%202&version=AKJV. It has become a song. See also Nsongurua J. Udombana, The Institutional Structure of The African Union: A Legal Analysis, 33 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 69, 72 n.20 and accompanying text (2002); H.W. Arthurs, “Mechanical Arts and Merchandise”: Canadian Public Administration in the New Economy, 42 MCGILL L.J. 29, 40 (1997). The reference to chief cornerstone draws
from Jesus’ statement, in relation to an Old Testament prophecy, that the rejected stone has become the
cornerstone upon which a solid structure is built and maintained. Matt. 21:42 (Authorized Version) (“Jesus saith unto them, Did ye never read in the scriptures, The stone which the builders rejected, the same
is become the head of the corner: this is the Lord’s doing, and it is marvellous in our eyes?”), available
at http://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Matthew%2021&version=AKJV. See also Psalms
118:22 (Amplified Version) (“The stone which the builders rejected has become the chief cornerstone.”).
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I. INTRODUCTION
Africa extended and strengthened its status as a maker of international
law by spearheading the creation and implementation of the norm of
“shared sovereignty” in international criminal adjudication and the management of petroleum resources.1 According to Professor Stephen Krasner
of Stanford University, a leading proponent of the concept of shared sovereignty, the Special Court for Sierra Leone represents a “contemporary example of shared sovereignty,” while the Chad–Cameroon Pipeline project is
a “second and somewhat less clear contemporary case” of shared sovereignty.2 Shared sovereignty occurs when a state allows an external institution to
address a specific issue within the state’s borders by granting the institution
powers traditionally reserved to the sovereign.3 Shared sovereignty in this
sense is an uncommon phenomenon and examples are rare,4 however it is a
subject that is experiencing a resurgence of interest.5
African countries are playing a crucial role in this revival through the
Special Court for Sierra Leone that was established to prosecute the principal actors in a devastating war in West Africa in the 1990s6 and through the
1

It is generally assumed that the early development of international law did not involve a great deal
of African participation. See MARK WESTON JANIS, INTERNATIONAL LAW 1–4 (6th ed. 2012) (outlining
the history of international law). Cf. James Thuo Gathii, Review of Jeremy Levitt, (Ed.) Mapping New
Boundaries in African International Law (Albany Law Sch. Research Paper No. 49, 2012) at 1, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2028999 (“Contributionists, such as T.O. Elias have long argued that Africa participated in the making of international law, contrary to Eurocentric
accounts that designated Africa as backward, stateless and as such having played no role in the making
of international law.”). Recently, there has been a rise in academic interest as to the role of nonEuropean communities in the making of international law. See, e.g., AFRICA: MAPPING NEW
BOUNDARIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Jeremy Levitt ed., 2008) [hereinafter MAPPING NEW
BOUNDARIES]; Lillian Aponte Miranda, Indigenous Peoples as International Lawmakers, 32 U. PA. J.
INT’L. L. 203, 236 (2010).
2
Stephen D. Krasner, Building Democracy After Conflict: The Case for Shared Sovereignty, 16 J.
DEMOCRACY 69, 77–78 (2005) [hereinafter Krasner, Building Democracy].
3
Jürgen Kurtz, Commentary to Professor Stephen D. Krasner, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1103, 1103
(2004) (examining the model of shared sovereignty that permits “the engagement of external actors in
specific aspects of domestic governance.”).
4
Stephen D. Krasner, Troubled Societies, Outlaw States, and Gradations of Sovereignty 31 (Stanford
University
Department
of
Political
Science,
July
2002),
available
at
https://bc.sas.upenn.edu/system/files/Krasner_02.05.04.pdf [hereinafter Krasner, Troubled Societies].
5
Different scholarly works have recently discussed this subject. See, e.g., Paul Schiff Berman, Jurisgenerative Constitutionalism: Procedural Principles for Managing Global Legal Pluralism, 20 IND.
J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 665, 692–93 (2013); Christian Eric Ford & Ben A. Oppenheim, Neotrusteeship
or Mistrusteeship? The “Authority Creep” Dilemma in United Nations Transitional Administration, 41
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 55, 102–03 (2008); Stefaan Smis & Stephen S. Kingah, The Chad Cameroon
Pipeline Project (CCPP) and the Dilemmas of the Government of Chad, 101 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC.
141 (2007).
6
The Special Court for Sierra Leone was created under a treaty concluded between the United Nations and the government of Sierra Leone. See Agreement Between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, Jan. 16, 2002, 2178
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Chad–Cameroon Oil Pipeline Project that created a model for effective production and utilization of natural resources for national development. In
fact, Africa may be appropriately described as the major theater for contemporary cases of shared sovereignty. This article argues that by situating
itself at the forefront of the shared sovereignty experience, Africa is making
significant contributions to the development of international law and, despite an initial setback, Africa’s effort represents a firm foundation upon
which major progress can be established.
This article highlights the key challenges that orchestrated the failure
of the Chad project, focusing on the inability of international financial institutions such as the World Bank Group (WBG) and state actors to successfully manage complex shared sovereignty arrangements, particularly in
weak states in unstable regions. The paper also notes that the entrance of
China and India as serious competitors for Africa’s petroleum has the potential to exacerbate poverty and underdevelopment in the midst of natural
resource abundance if African governments view the alternative sources of
investments as a reason to resist significant concessions of their prerogatives. Still, Chinese and Indian investment may ameliorate poverty and underdevelopment if the new entrants exercise their leverage to insist on people-centered natural resource development. The paper further identifies the
specific socio-political, economic, structural, and legal mechanisms that are
imperative to ensuring the successful implementation of oil revenue management or natural-resource-based shared sovereignty systems in developing nations grappling with sustainable economic development and democratization.
This Article is organized into five parts. Part I discusses the concept of
shared sovereignty and the development and implementation of the norm in
the Chad–Cameroon pipeline context. Part II grades international law making in this example, and concludes that the experiment was a failure. This
Part explores the reasons for the failure, and notes that the failure is more
about the form of shared sovereignty adopted—a weak version—than the
nature of shared sovereignty itself. Part III examines a stronger version of
shared sovereignty, but views it as incapable of replacing the weak version
because of theoretical and practical constraints. Part IV proposes a more effective option that embraces an intermediate version of shared sovereignty.
While this option does not dispense with the role and relevance of state actors, it places greater emphasis on the role of corporate actors in promoting
socio-economic and political development under the umbrella of shared
sovereignty. Part V addresses potential objections to the proposals made in
this Article.

U.N.T.S. 38342; Naomi Roht-Arriaza, The Complex Architecture of International Justice, 10 GONZ. J.
INT’L L. 38, 39 (2006–2007).
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II. NORM DEFINITION, GENERATION, AND
IMPLEMENTATION
Several centuries ago the Swiss Jurist Emmerich de Vattel made the
following observation about sovereignty: “Of all the rights that can belong
to a nation, sovereignty is, doubtless, the most precious and that which other nations ought most scrupulously to respect.”7 Among other international
instruments, the United Nations Charter and the Constitutive Act of the African Union provide for and protect the notion of sovereignty.8 Jean Bodin,
one of the earliest leading authorities on sovereignty and statehood, viewed
sovereignty as being within the absolute domain of the state, “not limited
either in power, or in function, or in length of time.”9 Nevertheless, a state
may, of its own volition, decide that sharing its sovereignty in certain issue
areas would be an effective way of accomplishing important objectives.10
Appropriate candidates for this arrangement are weak States or those that
have demonstrated a history of failure in tackling internal problems.
A. Concept of Shared Sovereignty
According to Professor Krasner, shared sovereignty involves the “engagement of external actors in some of the domestic authority structures of
the target state for an indefinite period of time.”11 A state applying the concept would engage external actors on an ongoing basis in domestic policy
making and the management of functions that would ordinarily fall under
the domain of the government.12 A state may institute a shared sovereignty
arrangement through a treaty, accord, compact, or some form of contractual
7

EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NATURE APPLIED
(C. Fenwick trans., Carnegie Institution,
1916) (1758).
8
U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 1; Constitutive Act of the African Union, available at
http://www.au.int/en/about/constitutive_act. (last visited Feb. 1, 2014); see also Elizabeth E. Ruddick,
The Continuing Constraint on Sovereignty: International Protection and the Internally Displaced, 77
B.U. L. REV. 429, 429–30 (1997) (discussing the prominence of sovereignty in the United Nations Charter).
9
JEAN BODIN, ON SOVEREIGNTY: FOUR CHAPTERS FROM THE SIX BOOKS OF THE COMMONWEALTH
3 (J.H. Franklin ed. & trans., Cambridge University Press 1992) (1583); Stephen M. Shrewsbury, September 11th and the Single European Sky: Developing Concepts of Airspace Sovereignty, 68 J. AIR L. &
COM. 115, 117–21 (2003) (discussing the evolution of the sovereignty doctrine).
10
Krasner, Building Democracy, supra note 2, at 70 (“The legitimacy of shared-sovereignty institutions would depend at first on their voluntary negotiation by internationally recognized national political
authorities. Shared sovereignty is not something to be imposed . .”).
11
Stephen D. Krasner, Sharing Sovereignty: New Institutions for Collapsed and Failed States, 29
INT’L SECURITY 85, 108 (2004) [hereinafter Krasner, Sharing Sovereignty].
12
Emeka Duruigbo, Pioneering Models for International Project Finance and Criminal Adjudication through Shared Sovereignty, in MAPPING NEW BOUNDARIES, supra note 1, at 205 [hereinafter Duruigbo, Pioneering Models].
TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS
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arrangement between domestic and external actors to take charge of, supervise, and control some specific issue areas.13 To make a viable, enduring arrangement, states must ensure that termination can only take place with the
consent of all the parties or upon the satisfaction of clearly specified conditions.14 The hallmark of an effective shared sovereignty arrangement is selfenforcement, where foreign and domestic parties have an incentive to adhere to the agreement because reneging would be prohibitively expensive.15
Both distant history and contemporary experience provide valuable
examples of shared sovereignty in practice. The Ottoman Empire created a
Council of the Public Debt in the 1870s to forge a pathway for servicing its
foreign debts and accessing the international capital markets.16 The Council
comprised representatives from France, Germany, Austria, Italy, Britain,
Holland, and the Ottoman Empire itself.17 The Council, whose members
were selected by foreign creditors, derived authority from an Imperial decree, and oversaw revenue from a number of principal taxes such as the salt
and tobacco monopolies, the stamp tax, and the spirits tax.18 With the consent of the government, the Council could engage in activities aimed at
promoting overall economic development.19 Its stature and prominence rose
to the point that it controlled over one-quarter of the Empire’s revenue and
employed more people than the Finance Ministry.20
Greece presents another relevant example of shared sovereignty. At
the end of the 19th century, Greece confronted economic calamity arising
out of an unsuccessful war with Turkey over Crete. Greece swallowed the
bitter pill of surrendering a measure of its sovereignty in order to secure
new funding to service its debts.21 It established an international commission for fiscal control and incorporated the terms for its establishment in a
provisional peace treaty between the countries involved.22 Commission
Members included representatives of major powers, namely AustriaHungary, Italy, Germany, France, Russia, and Britain. The Commission superintended significant sources of revenue such as state monopolies on salt,
petroleum, matches, playing cards and cigarette paper, tobacco duties, and
the customs revenues of Piraeus. These sources of revenue were essential to
repaying Greece’s foreign debt and the war indemnity demanded by Turkey.23 The Commission also challenged the country’s fiscal independence
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
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Id.
Krasner, Troubled Societies, supra note 4, at 27.
Krasner, Building Democracy, supra note 2, at 70.
Krasner, Troubled Societies, supra note 4, at 32.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 32–33.
Id. at 33.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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by limiting what the Greek government could borrow and controlling its
capital supply.24
Germany provides a more recent example of shared sovereignty following its defeat in World War II. Germany made commitments under the
NATO Status-of-Forces Agreements in the 1950s that shared sovereignty
with the Allied Powers over security matters within German territory.25 The
Allies had jurisdiction over their own troops who were at liberty to patrol
public areas including roads, railways and restaurants.26 Commanders of the
Allied forces were given powers to take any measures deemed necessary for
maintaining good order and discipline. In addition, the German military
could fight only after obtaining the approval of both the German and American governments.27
Africa is contributing significantly to the development of international
law and relations by pioneering modern shared sovereignty arrangements.28
Indeed, shared sovereignty arrangements play an important role in the development of international law by providing international law and institutions with an additional tool for strengthening state political and administrative capacity. Shared sovereignty presents a clear mechanism that weak
States (especially those emerging from conflicts or lacking adequate political structures) could deploy to build democratic and accountable governmental apparatuses.29 Political theorists contend that natural resources generate power tussles, or a culture of struggles for the resource rents by
various segments of the society, which impede the development of democracy in resource-rich societies.30 A workable shared sovereignty model
should obviate this predicament.
In addition, a successfully managed shared sovereignty arrangement is
likely to forestall debilitating internal conflicts and promote peace in the
country of application. This presents benefits to neighboring countries and
the international community because the consequences of failed and inade24

Id.
Krasner, Building Democracy, supra note 2, at 77.
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
See Anne-Marie Slaughter & William Burke-White, The Future of International Law is Domestic
(Or, The European Way of Law), 47 HARV. INT’L L.J. 327, 337 (2006).
29
Krasner, Building Democracy, supra note 2, at 70.
30
See Michael L. Ross, Does Oil Hinder Democracy, 53 WORLD POL. 325, 328 (2001) (exploring
the role natural resources can play in militating against democracy and noting that “oil and mineral
wealth tends to make states less democratic.”). But see Benjamin Smith, Oil Wealth and Regime Survival in the Developing World, 1960-1999, 48 AM. J. POL. SC. 232, 232 (2004) (disputing the conclusion
that oil wealth is more closely linked with non-viability of regimes and political instability). See generally Emeka Duruigbo, Permanent Sovereignty and People’s Ownership of Natural Resources in International Law, 38 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 33 (2006) [hereinafter Duruigbo, Permanent Sovereignty]
(discussing the unhealthy political contestation and corrosive corruption that are engendered by a strident pursuit of natural resource rents).
25
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quate governance often transcend national boundaries. It is a fact of life that
“[p]oorly governed societies can generate conflicts that spill across international borders.”31 Shared sovereignty agreements offer a means to avoid
these negative externalities.
Africa is contributing to the development of international law as well,
in the sense that embarking on shared sovereignty arrangements will continue historical traditions in international relations. As discussed above,
states have long relied on some models of shared sovereignty to promote
peace, foster good relations, and enhance national fortunes. The modern application of the concept of shared sovereignty by African countries further
solidifies the existence of this historical practice and contributes to its progressive development. Moreover, African countries are placing their mark
on shared sovereignty by extending the concept to new situations like natural resource development and management.32 The next section discusses
shared sovereignty in the Chad–Cameroon context by examining the purpose and design of the project’s Revenue Management Plan (RMP).
B. The Chad–Cameroon Pipeline Project
The multi-billion dollar Chad–Cameroon pipeline project is one of the
biggest private sector investments in Africa.33 One component of the project
relates to the extraction of oil from Chad’s Doba Basin. Another component
focuses on transporting oil produced in Chad via a 670-mile (1,070 km)
pipeline that passes through Cameroon.34 Commercial project partners established an unincorporated joint venture known as the Upstream Consortium to own and finance the exploration component.35 The pipeline component has two portions, based in Chad and Cameroon respectively. Tchad Oil
Transportation Company (TOTCO), an incorporated joint venture between
the Upstream Consortium and the government of Chad, owns the Chad portion of the pipeline.36 The Cameroon Oil Transportation Company
(COTCO), a joint venture between the Upstream Consortium and the governments of Chad and Cameroon, owns the Cameroon portion of the pipeline.37
The government of Chad entered into a plan with the World Bank, accepting the involvement of the Bank in managing revenues accruing from

31

Krasner, Sharing Sovereignty, supra note 11, at 86.
See generally Duruigbo, Pioneering Models, supra note 12, at 208.
33
See Emeka Duruigbo, The World Bank, Multinational Oil Corporations, and the Resource Curse
in Africa, 26 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 1, 39 (2005) [hereinafter, Duruigbo, World Bank].
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Id.
32
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petroleum development.38 The World Bank’s participation in the project
was driven by two principal factors. First, Exxon Mobil, the leader of the
consortium, insisted on the World Bank’s involvement as a condition for its
proceeding with the investment.39 Second, the World Bank’s belief that it
could promote its goal of poverty alleviation through the project.40 According to then-President of the World Bank James Wolfensohn, “the project
provides the best, and perhaps only opportunity for Chad to reduce the severe poverty of most of its population.”41 As a condition for its participation, the World Bank insisted on a revenue management plan (RMP) that
would ensure that the proceeds of oil development were used for socioeconomic development, particularly the alleviation of poverty and investment in the critical sectors of health and education.42
According to Mr. Wolfensohn, the RMP was intended to act as a counter to the economic distortion, corruption, and waste that often accompany a
large influx of oil revenues–a phenomenon known as the “resource curse.”43
The former Bank President said the Bank was influenced by the experience
of earlier oil-producing countries that had had difficulty managing naturalresource booms.44 Accordingly, the Bank decided to collaborate with the
government of Chad to develop a revenue management program “that targets oil revenues to key development sectors that are at the heart of its poverty alleviation strategy.”45
38

Id.
Exxon Mobil’s insistence was based on the belief that the participation of the World Bank would
provide the company with the needed cushion from political risk and insulation from critical nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). See Duruigbo, Pioneering Models, supra note 12, at 216.
40
In June 2000 the Board of Executive Directors of the World Bank voted to participate in the project because of its belief in the project’s commercial viability and capacity to assist with the alleviation
of poverty in Chad, one of the poorest countries in the world. Id.
41
Benjamin C. Esty, The Chad-Cameroon Petroleum Development and Pipeline Project (A), Harvard Business School Case Study No. 202-010 (Rev. Mar. 17, 2006), at 6 (citing Letter from James D.
Wolfensohn to Honorable James P. McGovern, The United States House of Representatives (June 28,
1999)).
42
Duruigbo, Pioneering Models, supra note 12, at 216.
43
See ANDREW INKPEN & MICHAEL H. MOFFETT, THE GLOBAL OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY:
MANAGEMENT, STRATEGY & FINANCE 10 (2011) (describing the resource curse as “a paradox of the oil
and gas industry” in light of the fact that living standards in many oil-producing countries do not match
their natural resource wealth); RICHARD M. AUTY, SUSTAINING DEVELOPMENT IN MINERAL
ECONOMIES: THE RESOURCE CURSE THESIS (1993); Paul Collier, Laws and Codes for the Resource
Curse, 11 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 9 (2008); Lesley Wexler, Regulating Resource Curses: Institutional Design and Evolution of the Blood Diamond Regime, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1717, 1723 (2010);
see also ALAN GELB, OIL WINDFALLS: BLESSING OR CURSE? (1988) (noting that inverse relationships
between oil exploration and subsequent growth and development are ordinary for oil-exporting countries); see also Esty, supra note 41, at 8.
44
Esty, supra note 41, at 8.
45
Id.; see also Jacqueline L. Weaver, The Traditional Petroleum-Based Economy: An “Eventful”
Future, 36 CUMB. L. REV. 505, 555 (2006) (“The Chad project (operated by ExxonMobil) was to show
the world a new model for petroleum development, one that would assure socio-economic benefits to the
39
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The RMP has several core components, notably specifications on the
allocation and distribution of the expected revenue, a monitoring committee, an international advisory group, and a special arrangement for the oilproducing Doba region.46 The government was given almost unfettered discretion on the expenditure of petroleum tax revenues.47 For direct revenues
from the project, the government surrendered much of its sovereign discretion and accepted that 10% would be held by the World Bank in a fund for
future generations. The rest of the revenue from dividends and royalties
would be deposited in a Special Revenue Account with 80% dedicated to
the financing of programs in five important sectors: education, rural development, infrastructure, social services, and natural resources. Of the remaining 20%, the government would keep 15% in its coffers to be spent on
recurring expenditures outside any oversight, and the remaining 5% would
be devoted to the development of the oil-producing Doba region.48
The RMP introduced several layers of oversight. The World Bank and
the government of Chad approved an annual expenditure, which was then
reviewed by a nine-member oversight committee—the Petroleum Revenue
Oversight and Control Committee.49 Committee representatives were drawn
from the government and civil society (representing local development
NGOs, trade unions, human rights groups, and religious groups).50 The
committee members were appointed for terms of three to five years.51 The
Committee had a mandate to publish an annual review of operations that
were subject to external audit.52 Some World Bank staff suggested that the
Committee include foreign membership in addition to the local members,
“but the Bank’s board vetoed this shared-sovereignty initiative.”53
The World Bank had considerable power and leverage in monitoring
the entire program and in reviewing all expenditures. The RMP was a binding instrument because the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and European Investment Bank (EIB) linked the government’s performance under the RMP to future lending by the World
Bank.54 The World Bank also created an International Advisory Group
local populations in the villages near the oil fields and pipelines. The huge effort was designed to prevent another Niger Delta.”).
46
Duruigbo, World Bank, supra note 33, at 41–43.
47
Id. at 41.
48
Republic of Chad, Law No. 001/PR/99, Jan. 11, 1999, translated in IAN GARY & NIKKI REISCH,
CATHOLIC RELIEF SERVS. & BANK INFO. CTR. CHAD’S OIL: MIRACLE OR MIRAGE?: FOLLOWING THE
MONEY IN AFRICA’S NEWEST PETRO-STATE 98 (2005); Edmund Sanders, Oil Promise Still a Dream,
L.A. TIMES, July 9, 2006.
49
Duruigbo, Pioneering Models, supra note 12, at 218.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Krasner, Building Democracy, supra note 2, at 78.
54
Duruigbo, Pioneering Models, supra note 12, at 218.
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(IAG), designed to last for ten years and composed of eminent persons.55
The IAG’s role, however, was merely advisory, and its functions were limited.56 As a result, critics found additional ground to view the project as
providing a weak form of shared sovereignty.57 This weak form contrasted
with a strong version in which there would be substantial sharing of sovereignty with a strong external body that could monitor projects and demand
and effect any needed changes.58
The World Bank Inspection Panel served as another level of oversight
for the project.59 The Inspection Panel was created in 1993 by the Board of
Executive Directors of the Bank to serve as “an independent complaints
mechanism for people and communities who believe that they have been, or
are likely to be, adversely affected by a World Bank-funded project.”60 Accordingly, the Panel afforded groups of citizens an opportunity to present
their concerns about activities financed by the World Bank that they considered inimical to their interests.61 The panel’s principal purpose, therefore,
was to serve as a link between the Board, which is the highest governing
body of the World Bank, and the people who are likely to be affected by a
project funded by the Bank.62 In response to a request for inspection, the
Panel undertook an inspection of the Chad–Cameroon pipeline project and
issued a report in 2001, in which it called for reinforced monitoring of the
project by the Bank to guarantee the protection of human rights.63
In December 1998, the government of Chad passed a law incorporating the principal elements of the RMP, including auditing procedures and
55

Press Release, World Bank, World Bank Appoints International Advisory Group on the ChadCameroon Petroleum Development and Pipeline Project (Feb. 21, 2001) available at
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/0,,contentMDK:20014994~menuPK:6428
2137~pagePK:41367~piPK:279616~theSitePK:40941,00.html. See also Genoveva Hernández Uriz, To
Lend or Not to Lend: Oil, Human Rights, and the World Bank’s Internal Contradictions, 14 HARV.
HUM. RTS. J. 197, 224 (2001).
56
Stephen D. Krasner, The Hole in the Whole: Sovereignty, Shared Sovereignty and International
Law, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1075, 1095 (2004) [hereinafter Krasner, Shared Sovereignty] (“Nevertheless,
the level of shared sovereignty is modest. Foreign actors are only fully engaged with the International
Advisory Group, and it can only give advice.”).
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
See Genoveva Hernandez Uriz, The Application of the World Bank Standards to the Oil Industry:
Can the World Bank Group Promote Corporate Responsibility?, 28 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 77, 120 (2002)
(describing a report issued by the panel).
60
The Inspection Panel: About Us, WORLD BANK, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/
EXTERNAL/EXTINSPECTIONPANEL/0,,menuPK:64129249~pagePK:64132081~piPK:64132052~th
eSitePK:380794,00.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2015); see also Sophie Smyth, NGOs and Legitimacy in
International Development, 61 U. KAN. L. REV. 377, 431 (2012); Daniel D. Bradlow, International Organizations and Private Complaints: The Case of the World Bank Inspection Panel, 34 VA. J. INT’L L.
553, 553 (1994).
61
See Duruigbo, Pioneering Models, supra note 12, at 219.
62
Id.
63
Id.
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provisions relating to the establishment of an oversight committee.64 Chad
commenced the sale of crude oil in October 2003.65 In November 2003, the
$6.5 million earned from the first sale of crude oil was deposited into the
account.66 In December 2003, the government approved its first budget including oil revenue and presented it to the RMP for approval.67
III. ASSESSMENT OF THE CHAD–CAMEROON SHARED
SOVEREIGNTY EXPERIMENT
This Part provides an assessment of the Chad–Cameroon project, and
also considers the possibility of replicating the experiment elsewhere. The
World Bank and a number of independent observers understood from the
outset that the success of this innovative model would assist in finding a
lasting cure for the resource curse.68
A. Failing Grade
The wisdom of extending shared sovereignty to petroleum development is still up for debate. It is clear that its first application in the Chad–
Cameroon Pipeline Project failed in some respects.69 Still, the Chad experiment was a useful initial effort because once its weaknesses are addressed
it can serve as a valuable blueprint for future projects.70 By extending
shared sovereignty to natural resource development Africa has made posi64

Id.
Emily Wax, Oil Wealth Trickles Into Chad, but Little Trickles Down Five Months After Opening
of Pipeline to Cameroon, Locals Await Benefits and Crime Rate Rises, WASH. POST, Mar. 13, 2004, at
A16 (reporting on the first few months of oil sales); United Nations, Oil Pipeline Opens for Business, 17
AFRICA RECOVERY 24 (Oct. 2003) (describing the fiscal aspects of the oil pipeline), available at
http://www.un.org/en/africarenewal///
subjindx/173comm.htm.
66
Wax, supra note 65, at A16.
67
Id.
68
See IAN GARY & TERRY LYNN KARL, BOTTOM OF THE BARREL: AFRICA’S OIL BOOM AND THE
POOR
60
(2003),
available
at
http://www.ic.ucsc.edu/~rlipsch/AFRICOM/
barrel.pdf (“The Chad-Cameroon Oil and Pipeline Project is the most significant, and most closely
watched experiment designed to change the pattern of the ‘oil curse’ and promote poverty reduction
through targeted use of oil revenues.”); see also Duruigbo, World Bank, supra note 33, at 32–33 (discussing the role of the World Bank in combating the resource curse).
69
Dustin N. Sharp, Requiem for a Pipedream: Oil, the World Bank, and the Need for Human Rights
Assessments, 25 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 379, 380 (2011) (noting that the World Bank’s efforts in the
Chad project are viewed as a failure); Scott Pegg, Chronicle of a Death Foretold: The Collapse of the
Chad-Cameroon Pipeline Project, 108 AFR. AFF. 311, 311 (2009) (concluding that the international
community’s experiment in Chad was an “abject failure”).
70
Stephen V. Arbogast, Project Financing & Political Risk Mitigation: The Singular Case of the
Chad-Cameroon Pipeline, 4 TEX. J. OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 269, 292 (2008-2009) (“Although many
NGOs were quick to pronounce the Chad RMP a failure, it would be more accurate to consider it a
worthwhile first experiment.”).
65
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tive contributions to broader international norms concerning shared sovereignty. Examining the failure of the Chad project with a view to understanding its pitfalls is essential to determining the structural changes that are
required for a successful model in the future.
In October 2005, buoyed by rising oil prices, the government of Chad
announced that it was jettisoning some of its commitments under the arrangement and sought a review of the revenue management law.71 In particular, under a law signed by Chad’s President in January 2006, the government wanted to redefine priority areas to include national security (in
addition to health and education) so that the government could equip its
military to contend with rebel uprising in the eastern provinces bordering
the already violence-prone Darfur region of Sudan.72 The government also
expressed its intention to abolish the future generations’ fund.73 The World
Bank was not amused by this change in direction and warned the government of Chad that it would consider its reneging on the agreement as a
breach of the loan agreement.74
The World Bank followed its threat with action. In January 2006, the
Bank blocked the government of Chad’s access to royalty payments and
suspended $124 million dollars in loans.75 In April 2006, the Bank reached
an interim deal with the Chadian government that obligated the Bank to resume loan disbursements and release more than $100 million in overdue
royalties to the government, thereby avoiding threatened closure of oil wells
by the Chadian government if access to the accounts remained blocked.76
The Bank also agreed to double the percentage of money the government
could spend without restraint, as requested by the government.77 This aspect
of the agreement more than doubled the government’s discretionary allocation, resulting in a sharp reduction of the poverty allocation.78 Instead of
helping the poor, the government planned to spend the newly unrestricted
funds on security.79
71
Lydia Polgreen, Chad Backs Out of Pledge to Use Oil Wealth to Reduce Poverty, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 3, 2005, at A15.
72
Lydia Polgreen, World Bank Reaches Pact with Chad Over Use of Oil Profits, N.Y. TIMES, July
15, 2006, at A8.
73
Paul Blustein, Chad Pipeline Project Steeped in Controversy: World Bank Reconsiders Role as
Nation Looks at Altering Terms, HOUS. CHRON., Dec. 28, 2005.
74
Paul Blustein, Chad’s Hard-Line Stance Tests World Bank, WASH. POST, Dec. 27, 2005. See generally David Vogel, The Private Regulation of Global Corporate Conduct, 34–35 (Univ. of Toronto,
Munk Ctr. for Int’l Studies, Working Paper No. V, 2006).
75
David White, World Bank in Deal with Chad Oil Funds, FIN. TIMES EUROPE, Apr. 28, 2006.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Bruce Zagaris, World Bank And Chad Reach Agreement on Use of Oil Profits, 22 INT’L
ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 371 (Sept. 2006) (stating that the new deal allocated 70 percent of the revenues
to poverty reduction).
79
David White, Why a World Bank Oil Project has run into the Sand, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2006),
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/1/83d76a34-8b76-11da-91a1-0000779e2340.html#axzz3ShLoej84.
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The Bank and the government of Chad reached a one-year deal in July
2006 that pertained only to 2007 revenues.80 The deal maintained the increase in discretionary revenues to the government and apportioned 70% of
all revenues from the project to poverty reduction.81 In a sharp departure
from the original arrangement under the RMP, the July 2007 agreement included indirect revenues, namely taxes and custom duties.82 Thus, it meant
that the World Bank acquired the authority from the new deal to oversee the
management of both direct and indirect revenues from petroleum production.83 This was significant because the indirect revenues would likely represent a substantial portion of government revenues in the years ahead.84
Under the agreement, the government of Chad was also required to undertake an audit of the special petroleum revenue accounts in 2006 and cooperate with the World Bank and other stakeholders in strengthening the role of
the Monitoring Committee.85 The Doba region would retain its allocation of
5% for local projects while revenues in excess of projections would be kept
in a reserve stabilization fund for use in the future.86 While the agreement
rejected the government’s redefinition of the priority list to include “security”, it nevertheless accepted the government’s addition of “justice” to the
list.87 The July agreement built on the April interim deal and was designed
to serve as a basis for a more enduring agreement that would cover revenues in future years.88
Nevertheless, the relations between the Bank and the government of
Chad remained frosty. In 2008, the World Bank felt that constraints to continuation of the arrangement were overwhelming and decided to withdraw.89 Its confidence strengthened by huge oil revenues, and acting on signals from the World Bank, Chad paid off its loans to the Bank, terminating
what was left of the relationship.90
80

Zagaris, supra note 78, at 371.
Cathy Landry, Chad Deal to Raise World Bank Influence: New Oil Production Accord Brings
Clearer Revenue Framework, PLATTS OILGRAM NEWS, July 17, 2006, at 5.
82
Press Release, World Bank, World Bank, Govt of Chad Sign Memorandum of Understanding on
Poverty
Reduction
(July
14,
2006),
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/
COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/0,,contentMDK:20994138~menuPK:258658~pagePK:146736~piPK:1468
30~theSitePK:258644,00.html.
83
Id.
84
See John A. Gould & Matthew Winters, An Obsolescing Bargain in Chad: Explaining Shifts in
Leverage Between the Government and the World Bank, 9 BUS. & POL. 1, 2 (2007).
85
Landry, supra note 81, at 5.
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Annalisa M. Leibold, Aligning Incentives for Development: The World Bank and the ChadCameroon Oil Pipeline, 36 YALE. J. INT’L L. 167, 178 (2011) (stating that on Sept. 9, 2008 the World
Bank announced that it was withdrawing from the project).
90
Id. at 168 (stating that the World Bank required the loan repayment as part of its withdrawal
terms).
81
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B. Reasons for Failure
Shared sovereignty arrangements such as the Chad–Cameroon Oil
Pipeline Project include foundational ingredients that could assure their potential viability.91 They can enhance domestic governance in those developing countries that are rich in petroleum because the government and an external institution, such as the World Bank, share key powers over the
revenues.92 Such arrangements could also help in building the basic foundation of a democratic society by establishing a link between the citizenbeneficiaries and the authority structures, giving citizens both a stake in
natural resources and an insight into how their government utilizes community resources. This sense of ownership exists in developed states through a
system of “taxation with representation.”93 These arrangements could also
reduce the corrosive problem of corruption and promote transparency and
accountability, which can only redound to societal benefit.94
Unfortunately, these benefits are unlikely to accrue without essential
ingredients like political will, effective institutional structures, and a strong
shared sovereignty arrangement. Indeed, the Chad project failed because the
incursion into the state’s sovereignty was not deep enough to divest the
government of the power to derail it.95 An incompetent government ran
most of the show and bungled it. Professor Krasner put it succinctly when
he viewed the arrangement as a case of shared sovereignty in “watered
down form.”96
The Monitoring Committee exemplified the inherent weakness of the
arrangement. The mandate of the Committee was to “verify,” “authorize,”
and “oversee” expenditure of revenues, but the precise contours of this
mandate were hard to identify.97 For instance, it was unclear whether its
monitoring function was limited to expenditure or extended to encompass
revenue collection and management.98 The Committee was also viewed as
91
Jason Schwartz, “Whose Woods These Are I Think I Know”: How Kyoto May Change Who Controls Biodiversity, 14 NYU ENVTL. L.J. 421, 440 n.89 (2006) (noting that “some notion of shared sovereignty over natural resources may . be desirable for developing nations to help maximize utility.”).
92
Krasner, supra note 4, at 41.
93
See Matthew Genasci & Sarah Pray, Extracting Accountability: The Implications Of The Resource
Curse For Csr Theory And Practice, 11 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 37, 43–45 (2008).
94
The effect of transparency on development, however, is open to question. See Alexander Gillies &
Antoine Heuty, Does Transparency Work? The Challenges of Measurement and Effectiveness in Resource-Rich Countries, YALE J. INT’L AFF. 25, 26 (Spring/Summer 2011) (“Despite the widespread support for transparency and advances made in numerous resource-rich countries, assessments suggest that
these gains have not triggered major economic or developmental transformations or any significant reductions in corruption.”).
95
Krasner, Troubled Societies, supra note 4, at 41 (noting that effectiveness is dependent on the
sharing of a great deal of sovereignty).
96
Id. at 34.
97
GARY & KARL, supra note 68, at 67.
98
Id. at 70.
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not sufficiently strong, which would militate against the effective discharge
of its duties.99 Critics suggested that giving the Monitoring Committee subpoena powers would strengthen it and enhance its work.100 The process of
removing Monitoring Committee members was also easy, leaving enormous room for the government to conveniently remove even competent
members who fell out of favor with the political authorities.101 A more
meaningful exercise of shared sovereignty would have shared the powers of
appointment and removal of Committee members between the government
and the external institution. One commentator saw this imbalance of power
and presciently predicted the project’s imminent failure, reasoning that any
workable scheme would have to provide for the appointment of members of
the governing or supervisory board by an international organization.102
The experiment also failed because the government lacked the political
will to follow through with even the modest commitments that it made.103
Even at the early stages, critics observed that there was insufficient evidence that the government would follow the RMP’s stipulations.104 They
pointed to the fact that the Chadian government spent $4.5 million out of its
$25 million dollar signing bonus on arms purchases.105 The criticism was a
bit overblown. While it would have been preferable for the government to
spend resources on the health and education sectors or follow the RMP,
arms purchases were not prohibited under the governing law nor did that
law cover how bonuses should be spent. Yet, this early expenditure portended a series of unpalatable moves by the government.
The civil war in Chad that has been raging for years was also a major
contributory factor to the project’s failure.106 The government had strong
legitimate interests in directing available funds to repelling rebel move-

99
Luc Lampriere et al., Managing Oil Revenues in Chad: Legal Deficiencies and Institutional
Weaknesses (Oct. 13, 1999) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Harvard Law School Human Rights
Clinical Program).
100
Id.
101
See GARY & KARL, supra note 68, at 72.
102
James C. Owens, Government Failure in Sub-Saharan Africa: The International Community’s
Options, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 1003, 1047–49 (2003).
103
Lampriere et al., supra note 99, at 2, 5 (stating that the success of the program would depend on
political will).
104
GARY & KARL, supra note 68, at 67, 69 (“But as good as the revenue management law sounds on
paper, there are very significant weaknesses in the design and practical application of the law. This was
made painfully clear in late 2000 when the government announced that it had spent the first $4.5 million
of a $25 million signing bonus paid for by the oil consortium on military weapons rather than on any
priority sectors.”).
105
Id. The Chadian government’s action embarrassed the World Bank; see Dana L Clark, The World
Bank and Human Rights: The Need for Greater Accountability, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS J. 205, 210 n.17
(2002).
106
Lydia Polgreen, World Bank Reaches Pact with Chad Over Use of Oil Profits, N.Y. TIMES, July
15, 2006, at A8.
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ments and restoring at least a modicum of political stability.107 Finally,
some commentators also linked the failure of the experiment to the obsolescing bargaining conundrum.108 Matthew Winters and John Gould described the obsolescing bargain theory and its effect on the World Bank’s
efforts in Chad as follows:
Unlike other forms of capital, wealth that is in the ground cannot flee
the grabbing hand of the state. However, extraction infrastructure requires
heavy initial investment, and this in turn gives investors some leverage over
the government at the point of entry. In Chad, the World Bank used this
leverage to create specific policies and institutions. Yet this leverage is
temporary. It erodes once the initial fixed capital investments are made.
“Obsolescing bargain theory” predicts that foreign actors have the greatest
leverage over a host country at the moment just before they begin to invest
in the infrastructure necessary for extraction. As investment capital morphs
into immobile infrastructure and, as domestic partners develop greater expertise and operational capacity, foreign-financed infrastructural investments can become hostages in host-country efforts to obtain an improved
share of the final revenues. Bargaining power therefore shifts to the host
country.109
Although this shared-sovereignty experiment was unsuccessful, it
should not sound the death knell for future collaboration by international
organizations, energy companies, and weak states to develop natural resources in a way that brings development to the country.110 The prospects of
shared sovereignty in petroleum development depend on how well the norm
is designed to achieve the main objectives. One option is to introduce a
strong version of shared sovereignty that is at the opposite end of the spectrum from the version employed in Chad.

107

Id.
Pegg, supra note 69, at 313; John A. Gould and Matthew S. Winters, An Obsolescing Bargain in
Chad: Shifts in Leverage Between the Government and the World Bank, 9 BUS. & POL. 1, 18 (2007)
(“As obsolescing bargaining theory predicts, the Consortium and the World Bank had invested their resources in the country, providing infrastructure and expertise, and now, with those costs sunk, Chad had
a hostage to deploy in its efforts to redefine the bargain.”).
109
Matthew S. Winters & John A. Gould, Betting on Oil: The World Bank’s Attempt to Promote
Accountability in Chad, 17 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 229, 233 (2011) (citation omitted). See also Michele
Ruta & Anthony J. Venables, International Trade in Natural Resources: Practice And Policy 25-26
(World Trade Org., Econ. Research and Statistics Div., Staff Working Paper ERSD-2012-07, March
2012), available at http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/reser_e/ersd201207_e.pdf (“In order to bid for a
licence, investors have to formulate a view about the long run return to the project. This is particularly
true since capital expenditure will be sunk; unlike other forms of FDI, a mine or oil well cannot be dismantled and moved to another location in the event of the project failing . . The combination of sunk
costs and high and potentially variable tax rates creates a severe hold-up problem.”).
110
Leibold, supra note 89, at 169–70 (“reiterating the importance of the Bank’s potential role as an
intermediary in resource exploitation projects in nondemocratic and underdeveloped countries in the
continuing quest to solve the resource curse.”).
108
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IV. THE STRONG VERSION OF SHARED SOVEREIGNTY
Even before the failure of the Chad experiment, Professor Krasner was
skeptical of its success, especially because it represented a weak version of
shared sovereignty. In a series of articles, Krasner called for a strong version of shared sovereignty that encroached further into areas traditionally
reserved to the state by allowing an international body to play a more robust
role in domestic governance. The features of this version are discussed in
greater detail below.
A. Features of the Strong Version
The strong version of shared sovereignty is built around the creation of
an institution, such as a trust, under an agreement made by a national government and an international organization.111 The trust will be domiciled in
a foreign country where respect for the rule of law is paramount.112 The resource revenues will be kept in an international escrow account controlled
by the trust.113 The government will appoint half of the trustees, while the
international organization will appoint the other half.114 All disbursements
from the account must be authorized by a majority of the trustees.115 The
trust agreement will stipulate broad areas of spending, but will also allow
the government a choice of specific allocations.116 The trust will not dispense funds for non-conforming spending.117 The trust may be empowered
to withdraw funds from the escrow account to implement programs if government delays or fails to act.118 The trustees will be subject to the laws of
the advanced democracy where the trust is domiciled.119 The arrangement
will also incorporate extra-territorial responsibility of home country of the
participating multinational corporations to pass laws mandating the firms to
pay revenues only into the escrow account.120 The country in which the trust
is domiciled will also pass similar legislation.121
B. Weaknesses of the Strong Version
The primary problem with this option is how difficult it is to sell in a
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
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negotiation. It is quite unlikely that any government would accept the level
of encroachment into its internal affairs that the above arrangement invites.122 The suggested extraterritorial legislation may also be a tough sell to
home countries of the foreign enterprises,123 especially if it will place corporations headquartered in their jurisdictions at a competitive disadvantage
vis-à-vis companies from countries without similar legislation.124 We may
also witness an increase in “paper re-incorporations” in jurisdictions that
have no link to the corporations but are instead selected because they would
not enforce such strict rules.125 In essence, the familiar concept of flag of
convenience that has been used for a long time in international shipping and
trade would be applied to foreign investment.126
This challenge is further compounded by the entry of China and India
into what has been described as a new “scramble” for Africa’s natural resources.127 With these countries eager to meet a significant portion of their
energy needs with oil and gas deposits in Africa,128 despots would be able
122
Stefaan Smis & Stephen S. Kingah, How the Government of Chad Can Meet Development
Pledges to its People Without Breaching its Obligations with the World Bank and Multinational Oil
Companies, 4 MANCHESTER J. INT’L ECON. L. 3, 39 (2007); Krasner, Shared Sovereignty, supra note 56,
at 1095.
123
See Edwin Mujih, The Regulation of Multinational Companies Operating in Developing Countries: A Case Study of the Chad-Cameroon Pipeline Project, 16 RADIC 83, 97 (2008) (stating that the
home countries of multinationals may be unwilling or unable to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction to
regulate corporate activities to ensure that such corporations act in a socially responsible manner).
124
Philip M. Nichols, Regulating Transnational Bribery in Times of Globalization and Fragmentation, 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 257, 288 (1999) (discussing the competitive disadvantage that American companies confront with regard to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act); Russell J. Weintraub, International
Litigation and Forum Non Conveniens, 29 TEX. INT’L L.J. 321, 352 (1994) (advancing the argument that
by entertaining suits by foreigners who were injured abroad, U.S. courts were placing American companies at a competitive disadvantage worldwide).
125
R. Tali Epstein, Should the Fair Labor Standards Act Enjoy Extraterritorial Application? A Look
at the Unique Case of Flags of Convenience, 13 U. PA. J. INT’L BUS. L. 653, 663 (1993) (discussing motivation for registering or re-registering ships in certain countries and noting that the primary motivation
is financial). See generally TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Olivier de Schutter
ed., 2006) (discussing the problem in connection with human rights legislation).
126
See generally Eric Powell, Taming The Beast: How the International Legal Regime Creates and
Contains Flags of Convenience, 19 ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 263 (2013); EMEKA DURUIGBO,
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: ACCOUNTABILITY AND COMPLIANCE
ISSUES IN THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY (2003) (discussing flags of convenience shipping). This concern
may be overblown in this instance—as opposed to extraterritorial human rights legislation—because in
the case of shared sovereignty, the oil companies are assumed to be willing participants, and should have
no problem complying with this particular condition if home and host governments agree to it.
127
Chris Nwachukwu Okeke, The Second Scramble for Africa’s Oil and Mineral Resources: Blessing or Curse?, 42 INT’L LAW 193, 193 (2008); Sharp, supra note 69, at 385 (noting Chinese and Indian
interest in African oil and gas).
128
Richard J. Stoll, Is Chinese Foreign Policy Targeting Sub-Saharan Africa?, in THE RISE OF
CHINA AND ITS ENERGY IMPLICATIONS 9 (James A. Baker Institute, Rice University, Dec. 2, 2011),
available at http://bakerinstitute.org/files/531/ (“Many observers feel that to feed its need for energy,
China has particularly targeted Sub-Saharan Africa.” (citation omitted)).
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to evade what would have been a major bargaining lever for extracting concessions from them—the non-availability of capital investment.129 Indeed,
oil and gas resources have enjoyed this advantage over the years, serving as
attractive collateral to lenders and other investors that would otherwise be
reluctant.130 The World Bank acknowledged as much in its final assessment
of the Chad–Cameroon pipeline project: “With the rapid increase in oil
price after 2000, it is almost certain that the oil would have been developed
and the pipeline constructed even without WBG involvement, albeit one or
two years later.”131
Apart from the practical constraint that virtually no government would
find the proposal for strong version of shared sovereignty attractive, there is
also the theoretical or conceptual challenge that the proposal is a guise for
imperialism or colonialism.132 This is a charge that is leveled at shared sovereignty generally, including the weak version deployed in Chad.133 Nevertheless, the complaint becomes more persuasive as the sharing of sovereignty deepens. Proponents of the strong version would of course reject and
refute the charge of imperialism. As a matter of fact, Professor Krasner sees
shared sovereignty as quite attractive because it does not fit those unpalatable labels.134 Krasner notes that shared sovereignty arrangements are not
tarred by the “delegitimating accusations of colonialism”135 that trailed other instruments like the Mandate System under the League of Nations or the
Trusteeship System under the United Nations.136 For instance, there is no
129
See Leibold, supra note 89, at 177 (stating that Chad’s President Deby threatened to turn over the
project to Chinese interests if Exxon did not meet his demands to pay millions of dollars in royalties,
bypassing the escrow account established under the Revenue Management Law). China has an interest
in Sudanese oil, depending on Sudan for a decent percentage of its oil imports. This is believed to have
exacerbated the dangerous, precarious situation in that country. See Elise Aiken, Energy Justice: Achieving Stability in Oil-Producing African Nations, 22 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 293, 303 (2011);
Okeke, supra note 127, at 198.
130
See ERNEST E. SMITH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM TRANSACTIONS 713 (3d ed., 2010)
(noting that “oil-exporting nations pledged their petroleum resources as collateral and became saddled
with huge debts to international institutions when oil prices later fell.”); Jedrzej George Frynas & Manuel Paulo, A New Scramble for African Oil? Historical, Political, and Business Perspectives, 106 AFR.
AFF. 229, 240 (2007); GARY & KARL, supra note 68, at 33 (discussing oil-backed loans by Angola and
its potential economic implications).
131
INDEP. EVALUATION GRP., REPORT NO. 50315: THE WORLD BANK GROUP PROGRAM OF SUPPORT
FOR THE CHAD CAMEROON PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT AND PIPELINE CONSTRUCTION 43 (Nov. 20,
2009) [hereinafter WORLD BANK ASSESSMENT].
132
See Stephen Ellis, West Africa and Its Oil, 102 AFR. AFF. 135, 137 (2003).
133
See Smis & Kingah, supra note 122, at 31.
134
Krasner, Troubled Societies, supra note 4, at 31.
135
Id.
136
For extensive and penetrating discussions of the “Mandate” and “Trusteeship” systems see generally Antony Anghie, Nationalism, Development and the Postcolonial State: The Legacies of the
League of Nations, 41 TEX. INT’L L. J. 447 (2006); Antony Anghie, Colonialism and the Birth of International Institutions: Sovereignty, Economy and the Mandate System of the League of Nations, 34
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 513 (2002); Antony Anghie, “The Heart of My Home”: Colonialism, Envi-
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foreign colonial power involved in the arrangement nor does any foreign
country station its nationals in the “colonized country” to direct its political
and economic affairs.
Shared sovereignty also appears more attractive than modern proposals
for neo-trusteeships for failed States and contested territories,137 which
many developed and developing states will reject as a direct assault on their
sovereignty.138 Working out the details of such trusteeships may also prove
difficult.139 Moreover, supporters of shared sovereignty arrangements argue
that states like Chad do not represent the will of the people, so their governments’ claims of sovereignty, let alone popular sovereignty, should be
discounted.140 Additionally, where the citizens of the country favor such intervention, government officials should not be encouraged to use sovereignty as a subterfuge to continue subjugating their people to unpopular practices.141 Indeed, there is evidence from early conceptions of sovereignty that it
was instituted as a tool to help the people, and not as a cloak to perpetrate
and perpetuate poor governance.142
V. AN INTERMEDIATE VERSION OF SHARED SOVEREIGNTY
The weaknesses of both the strong and weak versions of shared sovereignty leave room for exploring an intermediate option. The intermediate
option envisaged here will strengthen the responsibilities of the World
Bank, national government, and private oil companies while increasing opportunities for citizens in oil-producing communities.143 Its three comporonmental Damage, and the Nauru Case, 34 HARV. INT’L L. J. 445 (1993).
137
For various proposals on forms of modern trusteeship see generally RICHARD CAPLAN, A NEW
TRUSTEESHIP? THE INTERNATIONAL ADMINISTRATION OF WAR-TORN TERRITORIES (2002); James D.
Fearon and David D. Laitlin, Neotrusteeship and the Problem of Weak States, 28 INT’L SECURITY 5
(2004); Martin Indyk, A Trusteeship for Palestine, 82 FOREIGN. AFF. 51 (May/June 2003); Gerald B
Helman and Steven R Ratner, Saving Failed States, 89 FOREIGN. POL’Y 3 (Winter 1993).
138
Krasner, Troubled Societies, supra note 4, at 24–25.
139
Id. at 23.
140
Leibold, supra note 89, at 199.
141
Id.
142
Mortimer Sellers, Republican Principles in International Law, 11 CONN. J. INT’L L. 403, 410
(1996).
143
Peter Rosenblum has made the following observation regarding the Chad–Cameroon project:
At the core is a challenge to the sovereignty of undemocratic rulers . . . . Previously, no one
would have interfered in the relations between an oil company and an African state. He who
ruled the state controlled its resources . . . . There is still hope of a delicate balance, where the
World Bank strengthens loan conditions that reinforce the democratic process in Chad and
enable the Chadian people to better determine how their resources should be spent. That
would still threaten the sovereignty of leaders, but would also empower the people.
Peter Rosenblum, Pipeline Politics in Chad, 99 CURRENT HIST. 195, 195–99 (2000). This observation
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nents of stronger sovereign-international actor commitment, corporate immersion, and community participation are discussed below.
A. Stronger Sovereign-International Actor Commitment
While a strong version of shared sovereignty does not seem feasible, it
is also not possible to continue with the weak version and expect remarkable development outcomes. Accordingly, an effective arrangement requires
some level of tightening to avoid the loopholes that bedeviled the Chad arrangement with the World Bank. The following suggestion is on point:
For starters, the next RMP should give the Bank more enforcement
controls over the portion of the host country’s project cash flows
dedicated to development. This is an area that warrants careful legal
study. In the 2006 showdown Chad was able to access enough funds
to avoid a financial crisis while it waited out its conflicts with the
Bank. . . . In the future, with careful legal crafting, the Bank and the
host government may agree to characterize the use of offshore escrow accounts as a “commercial matter,” the handling of which governments can agree to via contract. This may prevent the host government from later asserting its sovereign powers to force funds
repatriation and, at a minimum channel any dispute to an international dispute resolution forum. If the government knows it cannot
quickly force a repatriation of offshore funds, its incentives to breach
a contract are greatly reduced. Similarly, if a host government knows
it does not have the funding to withstand a long dispute, the likelihood of the government attempting to override contract terms diminishes.144

Building and strengthening domestic institutions before the revenue
from oil starts flowing should also be an important component of this arrangement.145 One country that has clearly escaped the resource curse is
Norway, and its success has been attributed to the fact that it had strong institutions capable of withstanding the influx of oil revenues prior to the
windfall.146 Scholars believe that massive oil revenues weaken existing institutions or impede their emergence.147 An effective state should have instican be interpreted as favoring an intermediate version of shared sovereignty.
144
Arbogast, supra note 70, at 294.
145
See id. at 295; see also Leibold, supra note 89, at 198 (“[T]he Bank should have used its initial
leverage in the project to expand its control over the oil revenue until Chad’s political institutions matured enough to absorb oil revenue without undue risk of falling into a rentier economy. These policies
would have the cumulative effect of promoting institutional and democratic growth within Chad. This
growth would have created a crucial counterweight to the perverse political incentives created by oil
revenue.”).
146
TERRY LYNN KARL, THE PARADOX OF PLENTY: OIL BOOMS AND PETRO-STATES 216 (1997).
147
Patrick J. Keenan, Curse or Cure? China, Africa, and the Effects of Unconditioned Wealth, 27
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tutions for collecting and distributing tax revenues from the citizens, which
would also gather valuable personal information for meaningful national
planning.148
B. Corporate Immersion
One salient advantage of China’s strong interest in African energy is
the possibility of entrenching the approach of attaching oil and gas licensing
to corresponding investment in domestic infrastructure.149 This investment
could take the form of railroads, airports, refineries, educational institutions,
or health facilities. This feature should be required in every shared sovereignty arrangement. Where there are extenuating circumstances, such as political optics or inadequate personnel, that justify abandoning direct corporate involvement, private companies can still make their impact felt through

BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 84, 105 (2009) (“According to a political economic approach, there is increasing
evidence that resource wealth can contribute to a weakening of democratic institutions, an increase in
official corruption, and a deterioration in human rights practices.”). See generally Nathan Jensen &
Leonard Wantchekon, Resource Wealth and Political Regimes in Africa, 37 COMP. POL. STUD. 816
(2004); Leonard Wantchekon, Why do Resource Dependent Countries Have Authoritarian Governments?, 5 J. AFR. FIN. & ECON. DEV. 57 (2002). But see Patrick Wieland, Going Beyond Panaceas: Escaping Mining Conflicts in Resource-Rich Countries Through Middle-Ground Policies, 20 N.Y.U.
ENVTL. L.J. 199, 222–23 (2013) (“Recently the resource curse literature has been subject to criticism.
While it is true that possession of oil, natural gas, and minerals does not necessarily confer economic
success, it does not follow that natural wealth must lead to inferior economic or political development.
The resource curse is not a categorical rule that resource-rich countries are doomed to failure. Natural
endowment should be viewed as a double-edged sword with both benefits and dangers, leading to success in some cases and failure in others.” (citations omitted)); see also Stephen Haber & Victor
Menaldo, Do Natural Resources Fuel Authoritarianism? A Reappraisal of the Resource Curse, 105 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 1 (2011) (stating that fiscal dependence on oil, gas, and minerals does not necessarily
lead to authoritarian political regimes in the long run).
148
Terry Lynn Karl, Ensuring Fairness: The Case for a Transparent Fiscal Social Contract, in
ESCAPING THE RESOURCE CURSE 256, 278 (Macartan Humphreys, Jeffrey D. Sachs & Joseph E. Stigltiz
eds., 2007).
149
See Alexis Habiyaremye, CHINAFRIQUE, AFRICOM, and African Natural Resources: A Modern Scramble for Africa?, 12 WHITEHEAD J. DIP. & INT. REL. 79, 89 (2011) (“The Chinese strategy of
swapping large infrastructure projects for access to mineral resources also created a completely new
feature in the resource market. By building much needed infrastructure in Africa, China has the advantage of acquiring African resources in exchange for undertaking development projects on African
soil instead of sending oil revenues to foreign bank accounts. For example, in exchange for Angolan oil,
China agreed to finance huge infrastructure projects that include the building of 215,000 housing units,
restoring 1,000 miles of highway and 1,665 miles of railroad, plus the construction of a new international airport in the capital city of Luanda. Reconstruction in war-battered Angola was accelerated by three
oil-backed loans from Beijing, under which Chinese companies have built roads, railways, hospitals,
schools, and water systems. Nigeria took out similar loans to finance projects that use gas to generate
electricity. In May 2006, the China State Construction Engineering Company signed an agreement with
the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation to invest $23 billion toward the building of oil refineries
and a petrochemical plant in Nigeria. Chinese teams are also building a hydropower project in the Republic of Congo, to be repaid in oil, and another in Ghana, to be repaid in cocoa beans.”).
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indirect participation in development projects. They can make their staff
available to government agencies and non-governmental organizations executing meaningful projects in local areas.150 This part of the arrangement
may be bolstered by the World Bank’s leverage through its Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) that insures investment of private corporations in risky political environments.151 The Bank could condition such
political-risk insurance on acceptance of this immersion mandate by multinational corporations that enjoy MIGA’s investment protection.152 Besides,
the Chad project has demonstrated that the involvement of the World Bank
could be very beneficial to the energy companies, not only by providing legitimacy but also by providing insulation that enhances profit-realization.153
Exxon and other oil companies essentially conditioned their investment on
the involvement of the World Bank, realizing the importance of such collaboration in staving off criticisms from civil society groups and providing
150

See Arbogast, supra note 70, at 295 (“It is understandable that private companies don’t want to
take on responsibilities more properly within the purview of the government and the Bank. However,
there are ways to help the RMP succeed without taking over responsibility for its target projects. Companies like Exxon are experienced in “lending” technical staff to joint ventures. Occasionally they even
lend staff to government or non-profit organizations. Such staff makes major contributions to implementing joint projects. This occurs without the private company taking over responsibility for the venture. A willingness to lend a hand in this fashion could give timely reinforcement to the host country’s
development efforts; this in turn may contribute to a functional RMP that secures stable relations with
the host government and the native population.”).
151
MIGA was created by the Convention Establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, opened for signature October 11, 1985, and entered into force April 12, 1988. See Convention Establishing the Multilateral Investment Guaranty Agency (MIGA), Apr. 12, 1988, 24 I.L.M. 1598, available
at
www.miga.org/documents/
miga_convention_november_2010.pdf.; see also Malcolm D. Rowat, Multilateral Approaches to Improving the Investment Climate of Developing Countries: The Cases of ICSID and MIGA, 33 HARV.
INT’L L.J. 103, 105 & n.9, 126 (1992).
152
For additional discussion of MIGA, including history, scope of activities, and modus operandi
see Overview, MIGA, http://www.miga.org/whoweare/index.cfm (last visited Feb. 5, 2015); Sergio
Puig, Emergence & Dynamism in International Organizations: ICSID, Investor-State Arbitration & International Investment Law, 44 GEO. J. INT’L L. 531, 560 (2013) (“MIGA was conceived as a financially
‘sufficient’ institution providing risk insurance against losses caused by non-commercial risks such as
expropriation, war and civil disturbance to complement the private sector arms of the [World Bank
Group] to incentivize long-term commitment of resources. MIGA offers coverage and prices its guarantee premiums based on a calculation of both country and project risk.” (citation omitted)); see also Valentina Okaru-Bisant, Overcoming Challenges in The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency’s Risk
Insurance Coverage to Private Water Investors: Corruption and Consumer Risks, 57 S.D. L. REV. 277,
280 (2012); Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, The Settlement of Disputes Regarding Foreign Investment: The Role of
the World Bank, with Particular Reference to ICSID and MIGA, 1 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 97, 108 (1986)
(“MIGA’s objective will be to encourage the flow of investments for productive purposes among its
member countries, and in particular to developing member countries. To fulfill its objective, MIGA will
guarantee and reinsure eligible investments against losses resulting from non-commercial risk. Such
insurance activities, however, only represent one means of achieving MIGA’s objective, and the Agency
will carry out a broad range of promotional activities as well.” (citation omitted)).
153
See Arbogast, supra note 70, at 290–92.
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protection from political risks.154
Corporate immersion may even go beyond participation in development projects to involvement in environmental cleanup and voluntary reduction of natural gas flaring.155 In the Chad project, oil companies were
able to contractually shift virtually every responsibility for environmental
damage to the government of Chad.156 Considering that many developing
countries lack the technical expertise, financial resources, and political disposition to handle environmental matters, this is an unfortunate shift that
almost assures abdication and neglect.157 Host communities are doubly affected; not only from an environmental perspective but also from an economic standpoint because their economy may be built around fishing, farming, and other activities that are virtually incompatible with polluted rivers
and contaminated soil.158
Policy makers should start giving thought to a form of compulsory insurance policy that is undertaken and maintained by companies engaged in
oil exploration and production that addresses liability claims by affected
persons and communities.159 A program of that nature exists for oil and
shipping companies engaged in the transportation of petroleum across the
world. Under the Community Risk Insurance Program (CRIP) envisaged
here, cleanup responsibilities and compensation for property damage would
be financed out of the policy and paid by the insurance company like any
other form of insurance.160 The advantages include promptness in settling
154
See Scott Pegg, Can Policy Intervention Beat the Resource Curse? Evidence from the ChadCameroon Pipeline Project, 105 AFR. AFF. 1, 8 (2005).
155
Ashley Palomaki, Flames Away: Why Corporate Social Responsibility is Necessary to Stop Excess Natural Gas Flaring in Nigeria, 24 COLO. NAT. RESOURCES, ENERGY & ENVTL. L. REV. 499, 524–
27 (2013) (arguing that multinational corporations should embark on voluntary initiatives that minimize
harmful flaring of natural gas in places where regulatory oversight is weak or non-existent, in view of
the negative economic and environmental consequences).
156
Edwin Mujih, The Regulation of Multinational Companies Operating in Developing Countries: A
Case Study of the Chad-Cameroon Pipeline Project, 16 AFR. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 83, 83 (2008).
157
Emeka Duruigbo, Multinational Corporations and Compliance with International Regulations
Relating to the Petroleum Industry, 7 ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 101, 139 (2001) (discussing the
low level of environmental expertise in many developing countries).
158
Lisa Stevens, The Illusion of Sustainable Development: How Nigeria’s Environmental Laws Are
Failing the Niger Delta, 36 VT. L. REV. 387, 392–93 (2011) (discussing the negative effects of oil spills
and gas flaring on agriculture).
159
See Muhammad Masum Billah, The Role of Insurance in Providing Adequate Compensation and
in Reducing Pollution Incidents: The Case of the International Oil Pollution Liability Regime, 29 PACE
ENVTL. L. REV. 42, 57 (2011) (“The object of ensuring adequate compensation to oil pollution victims is
further strengthened by the provision of direct action against the insurer of a liable ship-owner. This is a
major departure from traditional insurance policy under which a third party may not bring an action
against the insurer because insurance is a contract between the insurer and the insured ship-owner.
Therefore, there is no privity of contract between the insurer and a third party victim. This is especially
the case in indemnity insurance as opposed to mere liability insurance.” (citation omitted)).
160
See generally Kenneth S. Abraham, Catastrophic Oil Spills and the Problem of Insurance, 64
VAND. L. REV. 1769 (2011).
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claims, internalization of externalities by those generating the harm, and
consequently the prevention of such harm from occurring or recurring.161
Another advantage is that insurance companies will serve as monitors
of corporate operations, pushing oil companies toward proper environmental behavior since the insurance companies are interested in minimizing the
payouts they make under any insurance policy.162 As commercial monitors,
they can be catalysts of desired change. Insurance companies will have an
incentive to act as effective monitors because their actions have financial
implications for their shareholders as well as themselves.163 This monitoring
role is likely to assume greater effectiveness when the insurance program is
coupled with a direct-action component that enables third parties to bring
actions directly against insurance companies under the policy.164
161

For a helpful discussion of externalities see RICHARD A POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
90 (8th ed. 2011) (defining externalities as costs or benefits that are external to an actor’s decisionmaking process); JAMES SALZMAN & BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY
25 (4th ed. 2014) (stating that “[o]ne of the key goals of environmental law is . to bring environmental
externalities into the marketplace.”); Russel Lawrence Barsh, Coast Salish Property Law: An Alternative
Paradigm for Environmental Relationships, 14 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1375, 1376
(2008) (stating that “[t]he classic example of an externality has been the impact on the quality of the
environment”); see generally R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
162
Tom Baker & Rick Swedloff, Regulation by Liability Insurance: From Auto to Lawyers Professional Liability, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1412, 1415 (2013) (“Once insurers accept the financial responsibility
for civil liability, they not only have an incentive to manage the defense and settlement of liability
claims, but they also have an incentive to reduce the likelihood that those claims arise in the first place.
This should make sense. Just as the fear of liability is supposed to incentivize potential wrongdoers to
take appropriate precautions, fear of liability should incentivize an insurer to encourage its insured to
take precautions. Once an insurer underwrites a risk, the insurer has every reason to try to reduce its
payouts by encouraging insureds to prevent the potential loss from materializing.” (citation omitted)).
The idea here is that when people have skin in the game, it tends to affect their behavior. See The Monitor, Bank Regulation, 32:10 BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL’Y REP. 20, 20 (Oct. 2013) (noting that in
the bank regulatory context, having skin in the game aligns the economic interest of sponsors of securitization transactions with those of investors in asset-backed securities, with the potential effect that securitizers would be more careful about the securities they helped place in the market, as they also stand to
lose their own investment if things go wrong).
163
This is in contrast to non-commercial monitors. While the latter category of monitors may still be
effective in carrying out their responsibilities, the fact that the outcome of their task does not involve a
direct financial cost or impact on their bottom line could be a disadvantage vis-à-vis commercial monitors. Besides, business groups tend to favor those non-commercial monitors that are not truly independent unless an independent monitor is imposed on them. See, e.g., F. Joseph Warin, Michael S. Diamant
& Veronica S. Root, Somebody’s Watching Me: FCPA Monitorships and How They Can Work Better,
13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 321 (2011) (discussing the use of independent monitors under the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act as a means of ensuring corporate compliance with the stipulations of the law).
164
See Billah, supra note 159, at 74–75.
[D]irect action against insurers makes the probability of actual liability even higher than
would be the case without the provision of direct action even when insurance is compulsory.
There are two explanations for this: first, despite compulsory insurance, an insured may be
bankrupt and the insurer could simultaneously deny the liability judgment on grounds of lack
of privity of contract between the insurer and the liability claimant; second, the insurer may
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Insurance could also have a cascading effect that goes beyond influencing the behavior of one set of actors. Insurance arrangements not only
affect the behavior of insurance companies and the insured persons paying
the premiums; the resulting change in action could spill over to those who
are only indirectly involved in terms of financial responsibility, but who
still generate harms. This chain of actions and reactions would lead to better
outcomes for potential victims. For instance, in the oil shipping area, where
some of the compensation funds are funded by the oil industry and not by
ship owners, oil companies have sought ways to protect their own interests
by improving the behavior of the shipping companies.165 One scholar describes the change:
[E]ven though the second and third tier of insurance through the
[Compensation Funds] are mainly designed for adequate compensation and are funded by the oil industry and not by ship-owners, these
arrangements indirectly put pressure on ship-owners to be more diligent in the operation of their ships. This is because oil companies,
who are the main contributors to both funds, are also the main, if not
sole, customers of the oil-carrying ships (tankers). Given that the operation of these ships has a direct effect on the ultimate contributions
that oil companies make to the Funds, oil companies as a group are
naturally opposed to and united against substandard shipping. This
opposition translates into various initiatives to motivate ship-owners
toward optimal care. One such initiative is a database maintained by
the oil industry on substandard ships, known as the Ship Inspection
Report (SIRE) Program. The database contains inspection reports on

plead some policy defenses or exceptions (e.g., non-payment of premium) against the insured
and consequently against the claimant. The provisions of direct action against insurers under
the oil pollution liability regime eliminated both these possibilities.
As insurers will be exposed to more frequent payouts to the victims of oil pollution in cases
of negligence by the insured ship-owner, insurers will charge higher premiums on negligent
ship-owners. Increased premiums will in turn induce the insured to reduce their insurer’s exposure to oil pollution claims. The only way the insured can do this is through improving
their standard of care so that the number of oil pollution incidents decreases from the existing
level. The dramatic reduction in oil pollution accidents may be at least partly due to this indirect incentive towards care, emanating from the provision of direct action in the oil pollution
liability regime.
The direct action provision also motivates insurers to be extra vigilant against the negligent
conducts of their insured ship-owners. Insurers have various tools such as premium rate variance, deductibles, policy limit, and even outright denial of coverage to check the carelessness
of insured ship-owners. Since insurers use these tools even when there is no provision for direct action against them, they now have an added incentive to use them more frequently. The
end result is increased pressure on the owners of substandard ships to take optimal care.
Id. (citation omitted).
165
See Billah, supra note 159, at 75–76.
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many oil-carrying ships.166

In the case of human rights and environmental abuse, a regime of
compulsory insurance could galvanize insurers and the insured to seek behavior modification among government security agents and public policy
makers that leads to the introduction and implementation of the right policies and initiatives that are environmentally rewarding and human rights
enhancing. In sum, insurance represents a market-based solution that has
the potential to alter corporate behavior while avoiding regulatory intrusiveness for the corporations and bureaucratic bottlenecks for the communities.167 The third component of the intermediate form of shared sovereignty
is community participation, discussed below.
C. Community Participation
The primary motivation for the involvement of the World Bank in the
Chad–Cameroon pipeline project was the alleviation of poverty or promotion of socio-economic development.168 The achievement of this objective
is not ineluctably intertwined with concentration of the wealth in the government and subsequent distribution to the population through public
spending. Economic development may even arrive faster through a system
of more direct distribution of mineral revenues to the population.169 Wealth
in the hands of the people could spur commercial ventures that create jobs
and facilitate the emergence of a veritable and vibrant middle class. It will
also replace displaced local sources of livelihood such as farming, which in
the case of Chad and other oil-producing countries, become casualties of
petroleum production.170
This intermediate version of shared sovereignty should therefore include a level of “local sovereignty” that involves equity participation of
host communities in energy infrastructure projects. Thus, communities,
through appropriate investment vehicles, should become partners in joint
ventures that are currently the exclusive preserve of governments and ener166

Id.
See Haitao Yin et al., Risk-Based Pricing and Risk-Reducing Effort: Does the Private Insurance
Market Reduce Environmental Accidents?, 54 J.L. & ECON. 325, 326 (2011) (stating that private insurance contracts can employ a system that rewards insured firms with premium discounts if they undertake
risk-reducing activities).
168
Duruigbo, World Bank, supra note 33, at 39–40.
169
See Leibold, supra note 89, at 198 n.281 (“[I]f oil revenue went directly to the people of Chad, it
could transform Chad’s economy to a ‘non-oil economy’ (one in which the government is accountable
directly to the people) and in this way offset the inertia of the resource curse.”).
170
Id.; see also Karol Boudreaux, From Curse to Cure, TCS DAILY (Oct. 19, 2004, 12:00 AM),
http://www.ideasinactiontv.com/tcs_daily/2004/10/from-curse-to-cure.html (reasoning that oil revenue
dividends distributed to Nigerian citizens “could provide an engine for human development and for entrepreneurial activity in Nigeria”).
167
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gy companies.171 Local equity participation could be accomplished through
the adaptation of a model used in Texas that has proven effective for almost
a century. Under the Texas Relinquishment Act, the government shares
control of oil and gas with the owner of the land overlying the resources.172
This model enables the landowner to share in the benefits of the resources
located on his land instead of being displaced and given a paltry, often onetime, compensation package.173 The expectation is that this approach will
obviate disruptive conflicts with landowners, weaken corruptive and corrosive government control, and unleash economic engines through capital
formation.
Local equity participation will also help to ameliorate the obsolescing
bargain problem discussed above. Recall that the obsolescing bargain occurs because “once the [drilling or mining infrastructure] investment is in
place, the advantage shifts through time from the investment supplier and
the petroleum companies, to the investment recipient and host countries.”174
This would empower local players, which could prove to be a useful antidote to the undue influence of the host national governments. First, if the
percentage accruable to the government is shared with host communities,
the government would be defending a smaller pie and thus would be constrained to weigh its options before embarking on a major battle with the
investors. Second, because other players—in this case, communities—have
a direct stake in the venture, the government’s unilateral actions to renegotiate the contracts as a way of expressing its leverage would pit it against
local, and not just foreign, interests.175 Communities would be reluctant to
give up gains once they start enjoying them.176 Third, if the distribution of
171
See Emeka Duruigbo, Community Equity Participation in African Petroleum Ventures: Path to
Economic Growth?, 35 N.C. CENT. L. REV. 111 (2013) [hereinafter Duruigbo, Equity Participation]
(discussing the traditional approach to energy joint ventures by corporations and governments and arguing for a more inclusive approach that includes community-based companies).
172
For discussions developing the idea of the Texas Relinquishment Act model as a form of equity
participation and its adaptation for adoption in developing countries see Emeka Duruigbo, Oil, Turmoil
and a Texas Export for Energy Security, 37 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 231 (2012) [hereinafter Duruigbo,
Texas Export]; Emeka Duruigbo, Realizing the People’s Right to Natural Resources, 12 WHITEHEAD J.
DIPL. & INT’L. REL. 111, 118–20 (2011).
173
Duruigbo, Texas Export, supra note 172, at 245–48.
174
Loïc Conan, The Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline: An Overview of the Threats to its Success and the
Means to Prevent its Failure, 31 UTAH ENVTL. L. REV. 205, 225 (2011).
175
See Humphrey Onyeukwu, Obsolescence Bargaining in Transit Pipelines: What Options Exist for
Securing
Resource
Supply
10
(2008)
(unpublished
manuscript),
available
at
http://works.bepress.com/humphrey_onyeukwu/2/ (noting that the investment recipient’s reaction usually takes the form of renegotiated contracts, higher taxes, expropriation, or seizure of the income stream
of the investment-supplying firm).
176
Critics deploy similar arguments against other social programs such as Social Security, Medicare,
and the Affordable Care Act, claiming that once people start receiving benefits they are unlikely to permit any real changes to programs.. See Cynthia Tucker, Conservatives Oppose Obamacare Because It
May Succeed, YAHOO NEWS (Sept. 28, 2013, 1:00 AM), http://news.yahoo.com/conservatives-oppose-
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gains to communities takes place for a few years before the government
seeks to revise the contract, the communities would arguably be in a stronger financial position to challenge the national government and ensure that
terms favorable to them remain in place.177 It is also likely that communities
would secure more favorable terms against the government when foreign
intermediaries like oil companies are in charge of distributing contract revenue,178 so communities would probably feel more secure with an initial
contract that involves those intermediaries instead of a contract that is concluded after the intermediaries are kicking them out.179
Africa’s singular success story in escaping the resource curse is Botswana.180 Through judicious and accountable management of public resources and wise investment in education and healthcare, “Botswana has
seen infant mortality drop, its people grow healthier, better educated, living
longer, and the number of poor falling.”181 Botswana’s economic and politiobamacare-because-may-succeed-050013503.html (stating that political opponents of President
Obama’s healthcare law are driven by the concern that if the law succeeds the beneficiaries would like
and depend on it, making repeal difficult if not infeasible, and thus garnering political advantage to Mr.
Obama’s party for generations to come); Kevin Drum, Republicans Nearing a Dead End on Obamacare,
MOTHER JONES (Dec. 3, 2013), http://www.motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2013/12/republicans-nearingdead-end-obamacare (“It’s funny that Republicans don’t believe their own propaganda. For years,
they’ve been hellbent on repealing Obamacare because they knew that once it was fully implemented in
2014, it would have millions of beneficiaries who would fight to keep it. Once the benefits of a new
program start flowing, it’s very, very hard to turn them off.”).
177
Of course, there is the possibility that community members would misuse the money they received from the project, but it is hard to argue that they would be better off without any money, which is
likely to be the case without equity participation or direct revenue distribution. See Duruigbo, Permanent Sovereignty, supra note 30, at 77 (discussing the negative experience of a community in Alberta,
Canada with distribution of resource revenues to community members).
178
See WORLD BANK ASSESSMENT, supra note 131, at 43 (“If [oil were developed without World
Bank involvement], the environmental and social provisions and the external monitoring arrangements
would not have been as thorough as those under the program. Also, it is probable that the revenue allocations to the “priority sectors’ would have been lower, and virtually certain that the support institutions
such as the Collège and the advisory group would not have been put in place.”).
179
See Macartan Humphreys, Natural Resources, Conflict, and Conflict Resolution: Uncovering the
Mechanisms, 49 J. CONF. RES. 508, 512 & n.13 (2005) (discussing skepticism of local chiefs in the Doba oil-producing region of Chad about oil revenues being actually spent in their region despite formal
provisions to that effect in the revenue management plan and their resulting petition to oil corporations
for direct compensation).
180
Paul Collier, Laws and Codes for the Resource Curse, 11 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 9, 11–12
(2008) (reasoning that Botswana’s rapid growth since the discovery of diamonds presents a counter example that punctures a hole into any argument about the inevitability of the resource curse); cf. Amelia
Cook & Jeremy Sarkin, Is Botswana the Miracle of Africa? Democracy, the Rule of Law, and Human
Rights Versus Economic Development, 19 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 453, 455 (2010)
(“Achievements such as Botswana’s noteworthy economic growth, political stability, and regular elections often eclipse issues like human rights, which remain on the periphery of most analyses of Botswana.”).
181
Keith Bryer, Africa Should Heed Botswana’s Simple Success Recipe, IOL (July 24, 2014, 8:00
AM),
http://www.iol.co.za/business/features/africa-should-heed-botswana-s-simple-success-recipe1.1724670.
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cal successes owe in part to the existence of strong local institutions that are
important components of the governing apparatus.182 These local institutions facilitated participation of the people in decision-making and served
as a constraint on the political leaders during the pre-colonial period.183
Through the local assembly, or “kgotla,” commoners were able to proffer
suggestions and criticize chiefs.184 In many other African countries, similar
institutions were destroyed or enfeebled by the colonial administrators.185 A
shared sovereignty arrangement should incorporate the development of
strong local institutions through which the citizens in host communities participate in the economic and political life of the country. While this may be
accomplished through existing traditional institutions such as local chiefs,
there should be no hesitation in jettisoning them in favor of brand new institutions if the existing ones are enmeshed in corruption and incompetence.186
These community institutions, in the form of community-based corporations and local trust funds, could be the vehicle for implementing the equity
participation component of the intermediate option.187
While the advantages of the intermediate option are evident, there is
also some room for concern. The following Part addresses potential objections to the proposal.
VI. RESPONDING TO POTENTIAL CRITICISMS OR
OBJECTIONS
The intermediate version of shared sovereignty provides an opportunity for national governments and international institutions to play more suit182
Nancy Birdsall & Arvind Subramanian, Saving Iraq From Its Oil, FOREIGN AFF., July/Aug.
2004, at 83. For a discussion of other factors that explain Botswana’s exceptional performance see
JOSEPH STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (2002), discussing the interaction of a wise
political leadership and assistance from experts from international institutions such as the World Bank
and the Ford Foundation; Andrés Marroquín Gramajo, Where Did the Miracle Come From? Exploring
Institutional Formation in Botswana, 17 BOTS. J. AFR. STUD. 45 (2006), exploring the role of foreign
aid, foreign human capital, ethnic homogeneity, relatively small population, and effective enforcement
of government’s development plans; and Yoshio Wada & Ken Togo, Development Assistance and Economic Growth: A Case Study of Botswana, MUSASHI UNIVERSITY (Feb. 28, 2008),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1099080, (discussing the effectiveness of development assistance.
183
Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson & James Robinson, An African Success Story: Botswana, in IN
SEARCH OF PROSPERITY: ANALYTICAL NARRATIVES ON ECONOMIC GROWTH 80 (Dani Rodrik ed.,
2003).
184
Scott Beaulier & J. Robert Subrick, The Political Foundations of Development: The Case of Botswana, 17 CONST. POL. ECON. 103 (2006).
185
Birdsall & Subramanian, supra note 182, at 83.
186
See GARRY LEECH, CRUDE INTERVENTIONS: THE UNITED STATES, OIL AND THE NEW WORLD
(DIS)ORDER 102 (2006) (discussing local corruption among the traditional chiefs and corporate representatives in Nigeria).
187
For further exploration of this idea, see Duruigbo, Equity Participation, supra note 171.
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able roles in achieving national development. It also fashions a more robust
role for corporate actors and promotes local participation by community
representatives. With this form of synergy, success seems more realistic.
Nevertheless, the intermediate option is not a silver bullet.
One major drawback of the intermediate proposal is that it does not
completely escape some of the problems with other versions. In particular,
one should not be overly optimistic of the possibility of its adoption by the
countries that need it. Sovereignty is a concept jealously guarded by political leaders who will not want to give up even a modicum of their sovereignty without a bruising battle. While this concern has merit, it is too early to
give up. Fortuitous circumstances may cause countries to adopt ideas, policies, and programs deemed unthinkable even a little while before.188 It is
not outside the realm of possibility that in some countries ambitious politicians who can incorporate shared sovereignty contracts into their political
platforms will emerge. They may be able to secure the support of those voters who, tired of the status quo, are looking for improved governance that
can arise from the cooperation of domestic officials and international actors.189
Corporate immersion may also elicit some objection from corporations
and critics who believe that public and private functions should be kept
separate.190 These critics argue that traditional obligations of government
should not be transferred to business entities that are better suited to delivering value for their shareholders.191 Efforts by corporations to assist with
development projects may draw the ire of the government, especially if it
highlights the government’s incompetence and corruption in executing its
own projects. The resulting schism could jeopardize the entire shared sovereignty arrangement, leaving all parties worse off. Nevertheless, the issue
can be delicately handled in a way that does not ruffle feathers unnecessarily while delivering progress to host communities.192
188
See DANIEL YERGIN, THE PRIZE: THE EPIC QUEST FOR OIL, MONEY AND POWER (1991) (discussing how oil-producing states in the United States accepted far-reaching reforms that they would have
rejected outright a little while earlier, but instead softened their opposition because of existential threats
faced by the petroleum industry in the absence of tough federal regulation).
189
See, e.g., Leibold, supra note 89, at 199 (reporting on interviews with some Chadian citizens who
favor involvement of external institutions such as the World Bank to improve domestic governance); see
also Krasner, Troubled Societies, supra note 4, at 39.
190
See generally J. Nna Emeka ‘Wokoro, Beyond Petroleum Production to Community Development: International Oil Companies as Proxy Governments, 5 TEX. J. OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 323 (2010).
191
See id. at 344 (“While companies operating in harsh regions, such as the Niger Delta region, have
little practical option when faced with immense domestic and international pressures besides performing
quasi-government roles in developing local communities, the reality is that such a role perpetuates corruption, apathy, and neglect. The cure is worse than the disease.”).
192
See Smis & Kingah, supra note 122, at 42 (“MNCs lose nothing when they adopt positive and
forward looking-pro-poor strategies in the countries where they conduct business. Hitherto, they have
been regarded as being aloof and too distant from the population. In terms of concerns over noninterference this option is sensible. However, MNCs can engage directly in social initiatives with poor

328

2DURUIGBO.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

9/29/15 1:35 PM

Nunc Dimittis or Chief Cornerstone?
35:297 (2015)

Another objection is that corporate participation is sometimes saddled
with corruption. Some corporate officers engage in corrupt practices that
undermine the execution of their projects.193 This problem has arisen in
World Bank-funded infrastructure projects.194 The Chinese investment approach recommended herein is also not immune from corrupt activities.195
Corporate corruption can be tackled effectively through an all-hands-ondeck approach that involves the World Bank, home countries of multinational corporations (MNCs), host countries, and watchful NGOs.196 For instance, transparency initiatives, while not a complete panacea, should be
vigorously supported to ensure that those responsible for managing oil revenues do not hide under opacity to mismanage the funds or defraud the
people.197 Channeling resources toward citizen education or public enlightenment campaigns that mobilize the people to hold their political leaders
accountable can further strengthen transparency measures.198
Local equity participation may also be constrained by the fact that
community-based corporations lack the financial resources to hold an ownership stake in joint petroleum ventures.199 Their financial predicament is
exacerbated by the fact that the oil and gas industry is highly capitalintensive. Appropriate arrangements could be worked out in which other
partners could “carry” the community corporations at the early stage, recovering their investment with “penalties” or interest when the projects start

communities where they do business. Rather than use government intermediaries, it will be better for
them to craft their programs directly for the benefit of the local communities that host them.”).
193
See Emeka Duruigbo, Managing Oil Revenues for Socio-Economic Development in Nigeria: The
Case for Community-Based Trust Funds, 30 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 121, 162 (2004); Leech, supra note 186, at 102 (“In March 2005, Chris Finlayson, Shell’s chief executive for exploration and production in Africa, acknowledged that the company had experienced significant corruption among its
employees with regard to funding local community projects.” (citation omitted)).
194
See generally Courtney Hostetler, Going from Bad to Good: Combating Corporate Corruption
on World Bank-Funded Infrastructure Projects, 14 YALE H.R. & DEV. L.J. 231 (2011).
195
See Pádraig Carmody, The Scramble for Biofuels and Timber in Africa, 12 WHITEHEAD J. DIP. &
INT’L REL. 125, 131 (2011) (discussing cases in Congo-Brazzaville, where the country’s minister of
forestry and environment is a major shareholder in a Chinese timber company operating there, and the
construction of a large house by the Chinese for a senior government official that manages large infrastructure projects in the country).
196
See Hostetler, supra note 194, at 259–70; Mujih, supra note 156 (discussing the role of NGOs in
influencing project outcomes, especially when legal regimes are lacking).
197
See, e.g., Gavin Hilson & Roy Maconachie, “Good Governance” and Extractive Industries in
Sub-Saharan Africa, 30 MIN. PROC. & EXTRACTIVE METALLURGY REV. 52 (2009); Gavin Hilson & Roy
Maconachie, The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative: Panacea or White Elephant for SubSaharan Africa?, in MINING, SOCIETY AND A SUSTAINABLE WORLD 469 (J.P. Richards ed., 2009) (critiquing the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative).
198
See Alex Kardon et al., Extractive Accountability: Implications of the Resource Curse for CSR
Theory and Practicei, 11 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 59, 63 (2008).
199
See Emeka Duruigbo, The Global Energy Challenge and Nigeria’s Emergence as Major Gas
Power: Promise, Peril or Paradox of Plenty?, 21 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 295, 448–49 (2009).
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producing or become profitable.200 The concept of carrying is well-known
and utilized in the oil and gas industry, with some situations (but not all) allowing the party advancing the money to collect a penalty or interest to account for the time value of money.201 One context in which interest is carried is a co-tenancy.202 Where co-tenants own mineral rights, some of the
owners may choose not to sign a lease with the oil and gas company interested in developing the minerals. If the company obtains a lease from any
of the co-tenants, it may proceed with the development in some jurisdictions such as Texas.203 In that event, the company will shoulder the costs of
operations but will be able to recover all the costs (without charging interest) before sharing any available profits with the nonleasing co-tenants.204
Carrying is also practiced in international oil transactions where the oil
company signs a production sharing contract with the national government.
The operating company bears all the costs of exploration and production. If
a commercial discovery is made, the company recovers its costs and shares
subsequent production with the government on an agreed formula.205
The Community Risk Insurance Program would also confront challenges. First, the environmental insurance sub-market is not a very attractive one for insurers.206 There are a number of reasons why insurers are reluctant to insure against pollution.207 For example, factual disputes,
engendered by the fact that some environmental injuries have a long latency
period,208 can lead to uncertainties about the policy years responsible for
200
201

Id.; see also JOHN S. LOWE, OIL AND GAS LAW IN A NUTSHELL 30, 50 (5th ed., 2009).
See OWEN ANDERSON ET AL., HEMINWAY OIL AND GAS LAW AND TAXATION 480 (4th ed.,

2004).
202

JOHN S. LOWE ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON OIL AND GAS LAW 436 (6th ed., 2013) (discussing the process of “carrying” in the context of a non-leasing co-tenant).
203
See generally PATRICK H. MARTIN & BRUCE M. KRAMER, OIL AND GAS: CASES AND
MATERIALS 120–39 (9th ed., 2011).
204
Id.
205
ZHIGUO GAO, INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM CONTRACTS: CURRENT TRENDS AND NEW
DIRECTIONS 72 (1994) (defining a production sharing contract as “an agreement under which a foreign
company, serving as a contractor to the host country/its national oil company, recovers its costs each
year from production and is further entitled to receive a certain share of the remaining production as
payment in kind for the exploration risks assumed and the development service performed if there is a
commercial discovery”).
206
Abraham, supra note 160, at 1770–71 (“Despite the demand for insurance coverage of pollution
liability, however, such insurance is not generally offered. . In short, there is a mismatch between the
losses resulting from oil spills, the insurance available to the victims of spills, the liability of the parties
responsible for losses caused by spills, and the insurance available to the parties who face such liability.”).
207
See id., at 1784–86; Elli Sperdokli, Marine Insurance for Oil Pollution, 49 TORT TRIAL & INS.
PRAC. L.J. 611, 619–20 (2014) (discussing the constraints to obtaining environmental insurance coverage to protect against liability from other actors’ activities).
208
See, e.g., Abraham, supra note 160, at 1771 n.5 (“There also may be long-latency diseases resulting from exposure to oil or chemical dispersants that do not manifest themselves for considerable periods after exposure . .”).
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coverage.209 Furthermore, there are the enormous costs of cleaning up pollution and remediating the affected areas.210 There are also legal obstacles
to eliminating the moral hazard that would accompany insuring against
gradually occurring pollution as opposed to sudden and accidental pollution.211 In the case of gradually occurring pollution, the insured companies
can take steps to detect the pollution almost at inception and be in a position
to mitigate the damage once they detect the pollution.212 With insurance,
however, they would likely abandon this responsibility.213 Accordingly, to
avoid the moral hazard, insurance companies were willing to insure only
sudden and accidental pollution, but judicial interpretation stymied this effort.214
Thus, even if such a program were adopted, oil companies may not
have adequate options for the purchase of the insurance.215 The international
community could address this problem through the creation of an institution
structured like MIGA. This institution would do for communities what
MIGA does for companies. In a nutshell, it would protect communities
from investment risks in the same way that MIGA protects businesses from
political risks that could adversely affect their investment, thereby dissuading them from proceeding with the investment opportunity.216
CRIP could also create moral hazards as communities exploit the existence of insurance to their advantage. Communities are constantly accused
of vandalizing oil pipelines and other infrastructure to capture their share of
the oil rents or to send a message to oil corporations and governments about
their grievances.217 While some of the accusations are not accurately attributed, because those making the charges have a motive for leveling them,
many of the allegations have considerable merit.218 A continuation or esca209

Id. at 1785–86.
Id. at 1786.
211
Id. at 1784–85.
212
Id. at 1784.
213
Id.
214
Id. at 1784–85.
215
For a more optimistic view of the capacity of the market to make environmental insurance available, particularly if there is a mandate for operators to carry insurance, see generally David A. Dana &
Hannah J. Wiseman, A Market Approach to Regulating the Energy Revolution: Assurance Bonds, Insurance, and the Certain and Uncertain Risks of Hydraulic Fracturing, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1523 (2014).
216
For a useful definition of risk, and identification of several commercial and non-commercial
risks, see Juan Camilo Hoyos, The Role of Bilateral Investment Treaties in Mitigating Project Finance’s
Risks: The Case of Colombia, 40 SYRACUSE J. INT’L. L. & COM. 285, 288–89 (2013), and Paul E.
Comeaux & N. Stephan Kinsella, Reducing Political Risk in Developing Countries: Bilateral Investment
Treaties, Stabilization Clauses, and MIGA & OPIC Investment Insurance, 15 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 1, 4 (1994).
217
Ibaba Samuel Ibaba & John C. Olumati, Sabotage Induced Oil Spillages and Human Rights Violation in Nigeria’s Niger Delta, 11 J. SUST. DEV. AFR. 51 (2009); Weaver, supra note 45, at 556.
218
For instance, oil operators in Nigeria are eager to make those allegations because those incidents
are classified as sabotage, which provides a complete basis for escaping liability in claims against the
210
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lation of such incidents is never too far off. Similarly, corporations may be
tempted to shift all responsibility to the insurance companies and not take
appropriate steps to conduct their operations as properly as they would be if
they were fully financially and legally accountable for any misconduct.219
This kind of problem has been identified in the context of “Director and Officer” insurance maintained by companies to protect officers in the event of
claims against them for wrongfully discharging their duties.220 Insurance
companies may reduce the moral hazard of corporate apathy by ensuring
that the oil companies have sufficient skin in the game, using known underwriting tools such as high deductibles and significant levels of coinsurance.221 Besides, oil companies are also conversant with the fact that
they would continue to suffer reputational damage and other costs, including increased premiums and even outright exclusions, if they continue to
conduct their operations below acceptable standards.222
VII. CONCLUSION
Africa is gradually moving from the position of an avid spectator to

operators for negligence and the resulting damage to individual and communal property. See O.
ADEWALE, NIG. INST. OF ADVANCED LEGAL STUDIES, SABOTAGE IN THE NIGERIAN PETROLEUM
INDUSTRY: SOME SOCIO-LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 14–19 (1990).
219
A similar objection has been raised in the context of a corruption risk insurance proposal under
MIGA. See Okaru-Bisant, supra note 152, at 291 (stating that “opponents of the corruption risk insurance propose a weak argument that providing corruption risk insurance coverage to private investors
will encourage the vice and sanction bad behavior” (citation omitted)).
220
See TOM BAKER AND SEAN J. GRIFFITH, ENSURING CORPORATE MISCONDUCT: HOW LIABILITY
INSURANCE UNDERMINES SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION (2010).
221
See Baker & Swedloff, supra note 162, at 1420 (“Insurers use contract design to mitigate moral
hazard in several ways. They use contract provisions like limits, deductibles, and coinsurance so that the
insurance does not fully insulate people from their losses, keeping their skin in the game. Limits keep
insureds’ skin in the game at the high end, deductibles at the low end, and coinsurance throughout.” (citation omitted)).
222
If premiums vary with risk, the theory goes, then policyholders should reduce risk to obtain
lower premiums. Insurers should also check episodically to make sure their policyholders are
doing what they can to reduce risk. These checks give insurers a chance to pressure policyholders to behave well and also provide early information that something is amiss. Policies
should be structured so that policyholders are unable to recoup all their losses. Policyholders
need to have some skin in the game so that they will always have a reason to be careful. Of
course, insurance only covers monetary losses, so policyholders will always have some stake
in the outcome (reputation, goodwill, time, and trouble), but insurers usually insist that they
also share monetary losses through deductibles.
Carol A. Heimer, Failed Governance: A Comment on Baker and Griffith’s Ensuring Corporate Misconduct, 38 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 480, 485 (2013); see also Okaru-Bisant, supra note 152, at 291 (arguing
that irresponsible companies would be screened out of the insurance protection); Baker & Swedloff,
supra note 162, at 1417–23 (examining the moral hazard of policy holders not internalizing the externalities and identifying tools for addressing it).
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that of key player in international legal development.223 One area of visible
progress is in the extension of the doctrine of shared sovereignty to natural
resource exploitation through the Chad–Cameroon pipeline project. The
Chad experiment may have failed, but the model need not be completely
discarded. The application of the shared sovereignty norm in petroleum exploitation for the socio-economic benefit of the population and political development of the country is still a possibility. Success in these undertakings
will require greater commitment from the World Bank and other international organizations, the humility of political leaders, sacrifice on behalf of
multinational corporations, the dedication of citizens, and the vigilance of
civil society. Indeed, Africa can continue to lead the way in further development of the norm of shared sovereignty over natural resources. Instead of
the weak form of shared sovereignty that was implemented in Chad, or the
strong version advocated by some scholars that has little chance of acceptance by national governments, interested parties should introduce an
intermediate form of shared sovereignty. The intermediate form, as outlined
in this article, has three core components: greater commitments by sovereigns and international actors, deeper involvement of multinational corporations in development policy, and a clear space for community participation.
The lesson so far is not “nunc dimittis” (departure time), but one of laying a
foundation that may serve as the chief cornerstone in the quest for symbiotic foreign investment and energy development.

223

For more on this point, see AFRICA: MAPPING NEW BOUNDARIES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1.
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